A century of India’s economic transformation: a critical review by Siddiqui, Kalim
 407 
 
Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 6. No.4,  January – February  2019     ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
 
A century of India’s economic transformation: a critical review 
 
Kalim Siddiqui 
 
Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics, University of Huddersfield,  
United Kingdom 
 
Correspondence author email: K.U.Siddiqui@hud.ac.uk 
 
Abstract: 
The objective of this study is to examine India’s transformation from a colonial to a 
modern economy on the basis of the macro-economic level changes that have occurred 
over the last century. This is important because it will help us to understand the associated 
growth performance and its impact on sectoral changes and employment in the wider 
context of developing economies such as India. The methodology to be followed here is 
derived from the aims of the study and comparisons of international statistics that provide 
the means by which to address the research questions and the objectives of this paper. 
The study found that during the colonial period, the Indian economy became subservient 
rather than sovereign in terms of policy matters. As a result, economic development was 
hampered by the removal of ‘surplus’, along with very high land rents and tribute charges. 
A densely populated country like India was drawn into the orbit of exploitation in the 
mid-18th century. Soon after independence in 1947, the Indian government took a number 
of initiatives to enhance industrial and agricultural development, but the biggest failure 
was that it did not make any real impression on the country’s huge unemployment 
problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this article is to analyse economic policy and its performance in India 
during the past century. In doing so, the article examines the limitations of such policies. 
This study is important because India is the second-largest populated country in the world, 
now having almost has same population as China, and also the study of a longer period 
of economic changes and polices provides us with a better understanding of the past and 
present. A critical examination of the Indian economy, besides India, can also help other 
developing countries to draw lessons from its strengths and weaknesses.  
The methodology to be followed here is derived from the aims of the study and 
comparisons of international statistics that provide the means by which to address the 
research questions and the objectives of this paper. Analysing pre-existing secondary data 
is the only possible way to obtain macroeconomic data. These include data from official 
sources and from international institutions such as the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund), World Bank and OECD. Due to the nature of the topic, it is considered that such 
methods will be appropriate to undertake this study. 
The objective of this study is to examine India’s transformation from a colonial to 
a modern economy on the basis of the macro-economic level changes that have occurred 
over the last century. This is important because it will help us to understand the associated 
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growth performance and its impact on sectoral changes and employment in the wider 
context of developing economies such as India. 
In recent years, India has experienced remarkably high economic growth rates, 
which have led to much speculation in the media that India is an emerging economic 
super-power (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2013). However, such discussions have 
overlooked the fact that this growth has not been accompanied by an associated rise in 
equality or reduction in social ethnic conflict. However, despite all failings and mistakes, 
the records of Indian government since the country became independent (about 70 years 
ago) in most respects has shown vastly better growth and performance than under the 
previous British colonial rule, especially on such indices as GDP growth rates, living 
conditions, health, literacy rates, life expectancy and overcoming famine and mass hunger 
(Siddiqui, 2018a; Patnaik, 2015).  
We need to look at basic facts about India’s experience with British colonialism 
and why colonial (mis)rule cannot be put aside. The study also intends to examine the 
legacy of the British Raj and also post-colonial development, and also that later failures 
do not in any sense invalidate my criticism of colonial exploitation and subjugation. 
British economic historian Angus Maddison (2007) calculated that India’s share of 
the world economy was a quarter of the world’s GDP in the mid-18th century, larger than 
that of all European countries combined at that time. In fact, in 1705, this figure was as 
high as 27% when Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb ruled the country. By the time the British 
departed India, GDP share had dropped to 3% (Tharoor, 2017). The reason was that India 
was ruled to benefit Britain and, as a colony for two hundred years, India was financing 
not only the industrialisation of Britain but also its military ventures in Asia, East Africa 
and the Middle East (Bagchi, 2010).  
This article is organised as follows. Following the introduction to this topic in 
section I, section II will briefly discuss the colonial legacy. Section III analyses the 
economic policies and performance of the post-independent period, in particular from 
1947 to 1990, whilst section IV examinees the period of neoliberal economic reforms, 
i.e., from 1991 to date, followed by a conclusion which summarises the findings.  
At independence in 1947, modern large-scale industries and mining constituted just 
7% of India’s GDP, while small-scale industries accounted for 10%, the agricultural 
sector, 49%, and services and construction, 34%. Total employment in the industrial 
sector was just 2.9 million people, which amounted to less than 2% of the total workforce 
(Patnaik, 2015). In contrast to this, small industries employed a much higher proportion, 
some 7% of the workforce, while nearly 72% of the Indian workforce was employed in 
agriculture; services including construction employed 18.7%. Cotton and jute were 
among the main modern industries established in the early 20th century in India (Siddiqui, 
1996).  
The tasks for independent India in 1947 were to accelerate the transition towards a 
modern economy, as dominated by industry. This was because at the eve of independence, 
the agricultural sector accounted for half of the country’s GDP and modern industry 
contributed only 7% of the total GDP. In fact, despite the development of a few industries 
during colonial rule, India was still predominantly an agrarian country with low 
productivity that suffered from widespread poverty and illiteracy (Patnaik, 2015). During 
the 1950s, the government took a number of measures in industrial and agricultural 
sectors through public investment in accord with its plans to establish several heavy and 
capital-intensive industries in crucial areas such as steel, machines and tools, power 
generation, and in irrigation and technical and scientific institutions such as the Indian 
Institute of Technology. As a result, in the 1950s growth rates rose to be higher than the 
 409 
 
Jurnal Perspektif Pembiayaan dan Pembangunan Daerah Vol. 6. No.4,  January – February  2019     ISSN: 2338-4603 (print); 2355-8520 (online) 
 
previous decades, but still lower than other East Asian economies (Siddiqui, 2016a). The 
most important issue was that this growth left unemployment and poverty largely 
unaffected. Moreover, by the late 1960s, the economy began to slow, heralding the start 
of a crisis that subsequently became more severe in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s 
where in order to fund populist measures the government resorted to heavy foreign loans 
(Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2013). This seemed, and indeed was, to represent only short-
terms relief for the country, and the situation became more critical in the 1990 (Siddiqui, 
2018a). 
World oil prices rose in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and, as a 
result, India’s import bills rose sharply; so, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, 
India experienced a balance of payment crisis. During that time, the then Finance Minister 
Manmohan Singh in his budget speech stated: “There is no time to lose. Neither the 
government nor the economy can live beyond its means year after year. The room for 
manoeuvre, to live on borrowed money or time, does not exist anymore. Any further 
postponement of macro-economic adjustment, long overdue, would mean that the balance 
of payments situation, now exceedingly difficult, would become unmanageable and 
inflation, already high, would exceed limits of tolerance” (Ministry of Finance, 1991-92). 
India asked for an IMF loan in 1991 and, in return, the country was asked to 
implement neoliberal reforms also known as ‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’ 
(Siddiqui, 2012). The mainstream economists welcomed this and emphasised that these 
reforms would increase competition and efficiency and, indeed, the role of individuals in 
determining national economic outcomes (Ahluwalia, 2002; Bhagwati and Panagariya, 
2013). According to them, any distortions were associated with government intervention 
and regulation of markets and the crucial issue of aggregate employment determination. 
They argued that under the free market, prices associated with factors of production 
would adjust to ensure that all factors were fully employed; the economy self-adjusts 
towards full employment in the long term. Any distortions induced by the government 
involving the use of monetary and fiscal policy to raise employment would merely 
generate inflation. They maintained that economic development requires rapid GDP 
growth, which has a “trickle-down effect”, ultimately benefitting the poor. Finally, it was 
claimed that the higher growth rates would generate large amounts of revenue for the state 
exchequer, thus enabling the government to invest more in the country and, accordingly, 
create more jobs (Ahluwalia, 2002; Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2013). 
 
INDIA’S COLONIAL LEGACIES 
It is widely recognised that, until 1760, India was the second-largest manufacturing 
economy after China. India exported cotton textiles to Africa, Europe and South East Asia 
(Bagchi, 2010). As J. T. Sunderland (1929:367), a British-born and US minister, noted, 
“India was a far greater industrial and manufacturing nation than any in Europe or any 
other in Asia. Her textile goods-the fine products of her looms, in cotton, wool, linen and 
silk-were famous over the civilized world; so were her exquisite jewellery and her 
precious stones…; so were her fine works in metal-iron, steel, silver and gold… [India] 
had great architecture…great businessmen, great bankers and financiers. Not only was 
she the greatest shipbuilding nation, but she had a great commerce and trade by land and 
sea which extended to all known civilized countries. Such was the India which the British 
found when they came.” 
However, in 1757, Robert Clive defeated Nawab Siraj-ud-Duala and Bengal was 
taken over by the [British] East India Company; at the time, Bengal was the richest 
province of India. However, after the British imposed colonial rule Bengal in 1757, and 
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especially after the end of Napoleonic Wars, India’s textile industries were systematically 
destroyed, large urban centres known for textile industries were depopulated, and as result 
the proportion of people dependent on agriculture rose dramatically. The textile industries 
in Manchester were protected, while ‘free trade’ was forced on India. As a result, Indian-
made cloths paid higher duties than cloths imported from Manchester. This, of course, 
had very serious implications for Indian handicraft industries and for social structure and 
the structure of the rural economy as a whole (Siddiqui, 1990). 
India dominated in global textile trade until 1760, but with the onset of colonialism 
this no longer remained the case. Britain imposed tariffs and duties of 70% to 80% on 
Indian textiles exported to Britain, making their sale unviable for Indian exporters. This 
made Indian textiles expensive in the British markets, while India could not impose 
retaliatory tariffs on British goods since the British controlled the ports and the 
government (Tharoor, 2017). Under colonialism, Indian manufactures did not receive any 
assistance from the government, despite lower wages and locally produced raw materials 
of which the domestic manufacturers could not take advantage. India still grew cotton as 
a raw material that was exported to Britain. The devastation of textiles’ deindustrialisation 
and the devastation of the textile industry as a whole significantly reduced the urban 
population, which is also known as de-urbanisation. As the number of people 
subsequently dependent on agriculture rose sharply, such development drove rural wages 
down. Of course, there were some good periods too. For example, the American Civil 
War interrupted supplies of raw cotton from the New World. It resulted in a boom for 
Indian cotton growers, but once American supplies were resumed in 1865, they suffered 
again (Siddiqui, 1990).  
In a very short period, India moved from being an exporter of high-quality finished 
goods to a mere exporter of raw materials such as cotton, jute, opium, spices, tea and rice. 
The huge increase in the cultivation of the opium, indigo, tea and jute led to the decline 
of land available for the cultivation of food crops. As a result of colonial government 
policies, India’s share in the world manufacturing exports fell from 27% to 2%, while 
exports from Britain to India rose sharply under the duty-free and free trade regime 
imposed by colonialism. In fact, the British tariffs and regulations strangled trade in 
Indian products, effectively closing off the British markets (Bagchi, 2010). 
In the agricultural sector, the British created layers of intermediaries between actual 
cultivators and the landlords who paid land rent directly to the colonial administration. 
Land rent increased sharply as compared to the pre-colonial period, and during the poor 
monsoon and famine, rents were not reduced which led to increased reliance on money 
lenders who exploited the peasants with their high usurious rates of interests, thus keeping 
borrowers in a position of virtual bondage. The colonial government also strictly followed 
‘free market’ policies, which meant hardly any investment was undertaken by private or 
government investors. This resulted in steep decline in land productivity (Bagchi, 2010). 
In contrast to the Mughal period, under the British land revenue system, if the 
farmers’ crop failed he was not exempted from paying taxes. The British revenue system 
was based on potential rather than actual output. The land taxes were not returned in the 
form of public goods or services, but were rather sent to the British government in 
London. The lack of investment either from public or private sources destroyed Indian 
agriculture (Patnaik, 2014). As Sir George Wingate expressed, “Taxes spent in the 
country from which they are raised are totally different in their effect from taxes raised 
in one country and spent in another. In the former case the taxes collected from the 
population…are again returned to the industrious classes… But the case is wholly 
different when the taxes are not spent in the country from which they are raised… They 
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constitute [an] absolute loss and extinction of the whole amount withdrawn from the taxed 
country… [The money] might as well be thrown into the sea. Such is the nature of the 
tribute we have long extracted from India” (cited in Tharoor, 2017:26). 
F.J. Shore, who worked as British administrator in Bengal, testified before the 
House of Commons in 1857: “The fundamental principle of the English has been to make 
the whole Indian nation subservient, in every possible way, to the interest and benefits of 
themselves. They have been taxed to the utmost limit; every successive province, as it 
has fallen into our possession, has been made a field for higher extraction; and it has 
always been our boast how greatly we have raised the revenue above that which the native 
rulers were able to extort” (cited in Tharoor, 2017:16). 
In the 18th and 19th centuries under Britain, opium was produced in India and 
exported to China. The British used the profits from the sale of opium to pay for imports 
from China such as tea, silk and porcelain, which were in great demand in the Europe, 
while there was no demand in the Chinese markets for European-manufactured goods. 
Consequently, European traders had to pay for Chinese products with gold and silver. 
The [British] East India Company established a monopoly on opium cultivation in the 
Indian province of Bengal, where they forced peasants to grow opium poppies. The opium 
trade solved this chronic trade imbalance. The efforts of the Qing dynasty to enforce the 
opium restrictions resulted in two armed conflicts between China and Britain, known as 
the Opium Wars, i.e., the first opium war (1839-42) and the second war (1856-60), when 
British and France troops attacked, and forced China to legalise the opium trade (Bagchi, 
2010). 
As Tharoor (2017:5) finds: “Britain’s industrial revolution was built on the 
destruction of India’s thriving manufacturing industries. Textiles were an emblematic 
case in point: the British systematically set about destroying India’s textile manufacturing 
and exports, substituting Indian textiles by British ones manufactured in England. 
Ironically, the British used Indian raw material and exported the finished products back 
to India and rest of the world.” Tharoor (2017:5-6) further notes: “The British destruction 
of textile competition from India led to the first great deindustrialisation of the modern 
world. Indian handloom fabrics were much in demand in England; …For centuries the 
handloom weavers of Bengal had produced some of the world’s most desirable fabrics, 
especially the fine muslins, light as ‘woven air’, that were coveted by European 
dressmakers. As late as the mid-eighteenth century, Bengal textiles were still being 
exported to Egypt, Turkey and Persia in the West, and to Java, China in the East, along 
well-established trade routes, as well as to Europe”. 
On top of this, Paul Baran calculated that about 8% of the India’s GNP was 
transferred annually to Britain as ‘Home Charges’ (Tharoor, 2017). Naoroji’s book 
Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, which was published in 1892, presented the ‘drain 
theory’. According to Naoroji, this transfer of surplus is the main cause of poverty in 
India (Bagchi, 2010). Another study by British economic historian Angus Maddison 
concluded: “There can be no denial that there was a substantial outflow which lasted for 
190 years. If these funds had been invested in India, they could have made a significant 
contribution to raising income levels” (cited in Tharoor, 2017:22). On top of this, 
thousands of British officials, who worked in India and received inflated wages and 
pensions and remittances, were another big drain on resources.   
However, recently, apologists for imperialism such as Niall Ferguson (2009) and 
others have denied that the possession of colonies has benefitted Britain or that it 
contributed to the destruction of the Indian economy and society in any way. This is the 
reason that it is important to briefly examine the economic and social consequences of 
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colonial rule in India. Bagchi (2010: XXII) notes: “the years between 1896 and 1913, 
[Britain superimposed a] long-term downward trend in income and living standards… 
hundreds of thousands of artisans lost their livelihoods, productivity-increasing 
investment in agriculture shrank, and business communities in many parts of colonial 
India were pushed out of the most profitable avenues of trade or become subordinate 
collaborators of European businessmen. India witnessed some of the biggest famines in 
history, in Bengal from 1769, in south India from the 1780s down to the 1830s, again 
between the 1870s and early 1900s in western and southern India, apart from many 
smaller famines that were not officially recognised.” Many artisans became tenants or 
agricultural labourers or simply starved to death during these famines. Moreover, the 
colonial government was insensitive to the deaths of tens of millions of Indians during 
such periods, including several hundred million alone in avoidable malnutrition and 
poverty-related diseases (Sen, 1981). 
After Britain colonised Bengal, the surplus extracted helped Britain in its military 
success against France. As Bagchi (2010: XXVI) emphasised: “the tribute extracted from 
India played a critical part in sustaining the British war against the French, and in 
facilitating the building up of the overseas settlements of Europeans through the process 
of European migration and British foreign investment from the 1870s to the First World 
War. Moreover, the migration of indentured labourers to European-controlled plantations 
stretching from the Caribbean to Malaysia provided sugar, tea, and other plantation 
products much needed by the global capitalist economy. Thus, Indian history is a critical 
part of global history as, indeed, global history is a part of Indian history.”  
Indian nationalists such as D. Naoroji, M.G. Ranade, R.C. Dutt, Mahatma Gandhi 
and Nehru were highly critical of the economic policy pursued by the British colonial 
administration in India. These policies were ‘free trade’ and the role of the state, which 
was only limited to the provisions of construction of ports, railways and roads to facilitate 
the transport of raw materials from interior regions to port and returning British-
manufactured goods to the Indian markets. Despite certain modifications after World War 
I, most of the profitable industries, for instance mining and plantations were still 
controlled by British businesses. The Indian nationalists viewed that state intervention in 
the economy could help to build basic industries. Unlike imperialist historians such as 
Vera Anstey, who blamed Indian culture for the country’s backwardness and mass 
poverty in the country (Siddiqui, 1996), nationalists, on the other hand, pointed out about 
the transfer of the annual tribute to the British rulers, and also the further drain of 
resources to finance British military ventures from Kabul (Anglo-Afghan War from 1839 
to 1842), Burma, Malaysia, Egypt, Sudan and Mesopotamia in 1860s. The British Indian 
Army was not only maintaining India’s security, but was also sent on foreign colonial 
expeditions to fight for British imperial interests. In 1922, for example, 64% of the total 
revenue of the government of India was spent on paying for British Indian troops 
despatched overseas (Bagchi, 2010). 
A major characteristic of colonial rule in India led to the destruction of indigenous 
industries and the failure to replace it with modern industries accentuated the situation in 
India. On the top of this, problems were compounded through high taxes, the drain of 
wealth and negligible growth in agricultural productivity and the exploitation of the 
peasantry by landlords and money lenders, reducing the rural population to extreme 
poverty. This resulted in widespread famine throughout India, beginning in 1770 with the 
Bengal famine which is estimated to have killed one-third of the entire Bengali population 
(i.e., around 10 million). With regards to the total number of deaths in major famines in 
India, British writer William Digby calculated that nearly 29 million had died between 
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1854 and 1901 alone (Sen, 1981). Bagchi (2010: XXVI) concluded that: “The process of 
colonisation of the Indian economy involved the extraction of a tribute from the economy 
at an unprecedented rate. That extraction, in turn, required the structural adjustment of 
the economy in the sense that the domestic absorption of the commodities produced by 
India had to be continually squeezed so as to yield an exportable surplus that would be 
remitted to the ruling country. That structural adjustment involved the severe depression 
of investment in both agriculture and industry and also required radical alteration of the 
modes of extraction of the tribute. Deindustrialisation in India was accompanied not by 
reallocation of normally growing resources to agriculture but depression of growth rates 
in both industry and agriculture”. 
In fact, through the control and subjugation of former colonial countries (i.e., 
periphery), the ‘core’ had established the practice of setting the prices not only of primary 
commodities such as only oil, and minerals, but also tropical agricultural commodities 
which could not be produced in the temperate regions of the ‘core’ countries. The rise in 
demand of certain tropical agricultural commodities was not accompanied by an increase 
in their prices, however. As Patnaik (2014:3) argues: “The fact that this did not happen, 
and has not happened till date, needs to be examined. And this explanation lies in the fact 
that capitalism imposes an ‘income deflation’ on the people of the ‘outlaying regions’, 
which restricts, even reduces, their purchasing power and hence their demand either for 
these goods directly, or for other goods which are their substitutes in the sense of being 
producible on the same land mass… ‘Income deflation’ ensures increasing amount of 
goods demanded at the ‘core’, but produced on the tropical land mass is made available 
to it without any increase in their prices even though tropical agriculture as a whole 
remains stagnant”. 
Table 1. China and India in the world economy and world population, 1705-1950 (%) 
 Share in world GDP in 1990 (Geary-Khamis PPP) 
international dollars) 
 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 
China 23.6 33.0 17.1 8.8 4.6 
India  27.0 16.1 12.2 7.5 4.2 
Developing Countries  71.1 63.0 42.1 29.6 27.0 
Western Europe 21.3 22.9 32.6 34.1 26.2 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 Proportion of the world population 
 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 
China 33.0 36.3 28.1 24.4 21.26 
India  21.6 20.1 19.8 16.9 14.2 
Developing Countries  76.2 74.4 67.8 63.2 67.0 
Western Europe 13.2 12.8 14.2 14.9 12.1 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Maddison, 2003, 2007; Bagchi, 2010; Tharoor, 2017. 
As Table 1 indicates, in 1700 India was the largest economy in the world, and its 
GDP share alone was 27%. However, a few decades after colonisation, India’s share of 
the global GDP had decline to 16.1% in 1820, 7.5% in 1913, and was only 4.2% in 1950. 
China’s share of global GDP declined also, especially in the aftermath of the second 
opium war, i.e., 33% in 1820 to 17.1% in 1870, and which continued to decline to 4.6% 
in 1950 (see Table 1). 
India was one of the richest and most industrialised economies of the world, which 
together with China accounted for about 75% of the world’s industrial output in 1750. In 
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1600, when the [British] East India Company was first established, Britain was producing 
only 1.8% of the world’s GDP, while India’s share was 27%. By 1950, after two hundred 
years of British rule, Britain accounted for 4.2% of the world’s GDP, while India had 
been reduced to mass poverty, illiteracy and hunger. Moreover, between 1900 and 1947, 
India’s average annual GDP growth was 0.9%, while the population was growing at over 
3.5% (Siddiqui, 1996), which was only negated by the high levels of infant and child 
mortality that reduced population growth to zero and life expectancy to only 27 years. 
Figure 1 indicates per capita economic growth of India between 1920 and 2015. The 
figure clearly shows that per capita income did not undergo any increase during the period 
between 1820 and 1950. However, after gaining independence in 1947, per capita income 
rose steadily, as indicated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. India’s per capita GDP from 1820 to 2015  
Sources: Tables of Angus Maddison (2003). The per capita GDP over various years and estimate 
is retrieved from the IMF (2017); OECD (2017). (accessed on 5 June 2017) 
 
On social issues such as the Hindu caste system, colonial rule did not make much 
difference. Caste is a reality in Indian society and is the predominant social identity in the 
villages. The castes also reinforce relations of dominance and dependence in rural India. 
Indian society has been marked historically by a level of institutional inequality due to 
the Hindu caste system, which includes even ‘untouchability’ against the ‘lower castes’. 
Despite the inclusion of judicial equality, the colonial administration did not take any 
concrete measure to undermine this caste social inequality. As Patnaik (2016:5) notes: 
“there was formal equality before the law for everybody under colonialism, but this hardly 
had any impact in weakening caste discrimination at the ground level…the absence of 
alternative opportunities to the most menial and degrading occupation, and were even 
prevented over large parts of the country from owning any land. What is more, the ‘lower 
castes’ were among the worst victims of the economic exploitation of the country under 
colonial rule, through the twin processes of ‘drain of surplus’ (which meant a transfer 
without any quid pro quo of resources to the metropolis) and ‘deindustrialisation’ (which 
meant the destruction of local craft production by import of machine made manufactured 
goods from metropolis). The burden of this exploitation greatly increased the pressure of 
population on land through a process of pauperisation of the peasantry, and this growing 
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pressure entailed a lowering of real wages of agricultural labourers, among whom, of 
course, the ‘lower castes’ had an overwhelmingly presence”. 
 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE FROM 1947 TO 1990  
After independence, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, recognised that 
without the economic diversification and expansion of Indian industries, the aims of 
modernisation would not be accomplished. He believed that science and technology held 
the key to India’s development and thus the consequent elimination of backwardness and 
poverty. It was hoped that such polices would increase productivity and generate 
employment, the latter required to absorb India’s large number of unemployed and 
address the poverty and deprivation colonial rule left behind. The Second Five Year Plan 
was launched in 1956 with the target of increasing investment in key industries, power 
and infrastructure (Patnaik, 2015). 
The “inward-looking” dirigiste economic strategy was adopted in India from the 
1950s onwards, which was seen as the most suitable option by the ruling elites. Also 
known as the ‘import substitution’ strategy, under this strategy the public sector was 
assigned a leading role in the development process. Between 1951 and 1965, the annual 
average industrial growth was 7%, which was much higher than anything that had been 
seen in the past (Nagaraj, 1997). There was also a notable shift as the importance of 
traditional industries such as jute and cotton declined, while modern industries such as 
machinery, engineering, chemicals, rubber, pharmaceuticals, power and steel became 
more important. However, the industrial growth also coincided with huge increments in 
foreign debts and foreign aid, which meant that industrialisation in India did not allow for 
financial self-reliance (Siddiqui, 2018b). Moreover, Indian industries did not allocate 
much money for research and development, which resulted in increased reliance on 
imported technology and foreign multinational corporations. Although pre-reform 
industrialisation in India was impressive in terms of its growth, it failed to make any real 
impression on growing unemployment (Siddiqui, 2014a; Nagaraj, 1997). 
However, such policies were criticised by the neoclassical economists as 
inefficient, promoting delays and corruption (Ahluwalia, 2002). The proponents of 
neoliberal reforms argue that rather than adopting the classic Asian strategy - exporting 
labour-intensive low-priced manufactured goods to the West - India has relied on its 
domestic market more than exports and consumption more than investment. In fact, the 
then government aimed to remove serious gaps in the production structure. Due to the 
long gestation period, private investors saw such investments as high risk, and also lacked 
the funds to support them (Patnaik, 2016). In fact, the government was determined not to 
tax the rich. Therefore, for public sector investment funding, the government relied on 
foreign aid, deficit financing and indirect taxation. As a result, for example, the share of 
indirect taxes to the total tax revenue increased from 61.9% in 1955 to 70.7% in 1966 
(Patnaik, 2015). Both indirect taxes and deficit financing were regressive, meaning that 
they had a dampening effect on income for the majority of people. As a result, the 
domestic market for mass consumer goods did not increase.  
The domestic demands for manufacturing were dependent on government 
expenditure. The government paid little attention towards demand for manufactured 
goods and also the government’s inability to mobilise the resources to finance 
industrialisation (Siddiqui, 2018b). Land concentration left the agriculture incomes 
unequally distributed among the rural population and, thus, placed a stranglehold on the 
expansion of the home market for industrial goods. Inability to tax the propertied classes 
meant that the state had to rely on other form of potentially inflationary finances like 
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indirect taxation and borrowings. The domestic industries were protected in the home 
market meaning a less competitive environment and little threat to their profits. It also 
resulted in slow growth and little innovations (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2002).   
Regarding the agricultural sector, from which nearly three-quarters of India’s 
population received their income, in the 1950s the Indian government passed legislation 
to implement land reforms, including the removal of rent-seeking absentee landlords. But 
these modest reforms were met with opposition from the government’s own minsters and 
administrators, and further agrarian reforms in the 1950s failed to make any real 
impression on the rural inequality. As a result, the reforms failed in removing the agrarian 
constraints, both in terms of the hurdle to the expansion of domestic market and were also 
in their inability to end the landlords’ domination in rural areas. As Das Gupta notes: 
“This has four dimensions: first, it defined the demand constraint in the country and 
perpetuated the huge labour reserves inherited from the colonial period. Second, it ruled 
out a classical capitalist transformation in ruling out a process of development through 
creation and channelling of an agrarian surplus into industry. Third, it perpetuated one of 
the strongest links in preserving the links between caste, gender, and property relations 
in the hierarchy of definition of property rights. Fourth, it ensured the perpetuation of 
labour regimes based on extra-economic coercion” (Das Gupta, 2016:123).  
However, post-independent agrarian reform - though not fully implemented and 
uneven in its depth from state to state – did manage to restrict, though not remove, rent-
based landlordism, and encourage rural capitalism. The land reform measures in the 
1950s, while benefitting some tenants, failed to break land concentration and the top 15% 
of landowners continued to hold the same percentage of land as before the measures were 
undertaken (Siddiqui, 1999). Rural inequality persisted, which had obvious socio-
economic implications as it restricted the domestic market, including demands for 
manufacturing goods. On the social front, few changes were witnessed: landlords’ 
oppressive Hindu caste system remained largely intact and untouchables (also known 
Dalits), who constituted the core of the landless class and were denied land ownership 
under the old Hindu caste system, remained landless (Siddiqui, 2014b). 
In the mid-1960s, the rising prices and balance of payment crisis became 
unmanageable, leading to the devaluation of the rupee and forcing India to seek a loan 
from the IMF. Moreover, in the late 1960s, the adoption of HYV (High Yielding 
Varieties) seeds in certain crops, also known as the Green Revolution, raised agricultural 
output if HYV seeds are applied in the correct proportion with water, fertilizers and 
pesticides. Initially it encouraged large landholders towards direct cultivation as 
additional investment was assured to bring in higher profits due to the availability of 
subsidised credit, irrigation, and fertilizers. Soon, the Green Revolution also spread to 
middle farmers. At the time, this did manage to raise agricultural output and yields in 
certain crops (Siddiqui, 1999); however, now some of the negative effects are more 
visible such as damage to soil, the level of the water table and the quality of water. But, 
overall, it did improve the incomes of certain sections of the rural population, which 
proved to be temporary relief.  
Another such short relief came in the 1980s in the form of availability of foreign 
funds for borrowing. Actually, the extensive funds from oil exporting countries found 
their way into the Indian financial system. This private financial capital was now available 
for borrowing, and India took this opportunity and borrowed from commercial banks and 
non-resident Indians. Access to such capital allowed the government to increase its debt-
financed investment. This came as a big relief for the government as the money was used 
to pay for imports that kept domestic inflation under control. As a result, growth rates 
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rose more than the previous decade. Because of the slow growth of the period prior to 
1980, this sudden increase was known as the “Hindu Rate of Growth”, where India was 
seen to be trapped in low rates of growth by multilateral organisations. 
The dirigiste economic strategy brought a very positive change in the industrial 
sector by building industries in key areas such as power generation, steel and 
manufacturing industries. However, it failed to achieve land reforms in the sense of 
curbing the rural power of the landlords and bringing socio-economic equality across the 
countryside. Despite a number of land reform measures, it did not break the social and 
economic power of the landlords and also failed to fully implement the ‘land to the tiller’ 
policy. The rural poor did not experience any betterment as the majority of these sections 
also belonged to the lower castes. The government undertook measures to nationalise 
banks, which meant more credit was made available to the agricultural sector, and 
subsidies were also extended to agricultural inputs to support the ‘Green Revolution’. 
These measures ultimately increased food production and reduced reliance on food 
imports. However, such dirigiste strategy promoted capitalist development in agriculture 
and exposed certain inner contradictions, especially the fiscal crisis of the state. In the 
1980s, government began to gradually liberalise trade so that by the mid-1980s India’s 
current account deficit and external debt started to grow. Also, imports grew at a faster 
rate and the rising current account deficit became increasingly financed by commercial 
borrowing and non-resident Indian (NIR) remittances, which meant a greater dependence 
on foreign sources and at higher costs and short-term financing. And as a result, India’s 
foreign debt sharply rose from US$ 20.5 billion in 1980 to US$ 72 billion in 1992, making 
India the world’s third largest debtor after Brazil and Mexico (Nayyar, 2017). 
The government reliance on foreign borrowing provided short-term financial relief 
and in the late-1980s easy access to international credit resulted in the rise of both public 
and foreign debts. Moreover, the Gulf War and decline in remittances from Indian 
workers in that region, a dramatic rise in oil prices and, ultimately, the collapse of Soviet 
Union, created a very challenging situation for India. All these adverse domestic and 
international factors led to an increase in the current account deficit, which created fear 
among foreign lenders that India may not be able to meet its debt service obligations. As 
a result, availability of foreign funds began to dry up, which led to a sharp reduction in 
reserves and, in July 1991, a balance of payments crisis.  
 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE FROM 1991 TO 2017 
India saw a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991, when it approached IMF for 
emergency loans. In return, the IMF demanded the implementation of neoliberal 
economic reforms involving trade liberalisation, a more favourable climate for foreign 
investors and also wide-ranging deregulation measures. The adoption of the ‘Structural 
Adjustment Programme’ meant increased reliance on market forces and a new policy 
towards foreign capital. With the adoption of market-friendly policies towards foreign 
capital, the net inflows of capital rose from less than US$ 1 billion in 1993 to US$ 6 
billion by 1999, which further rose from US$ 15.7 billion in 2003 to $65 billion in 2014 
(Chandrasekhar, 2013). However, despite the government’s efforts to attract foreign 
capital, India still received less FDI than other developing countries such as Mexico, 
Turkey and China, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. FDI net inflows across countries, 2016. 
Source: OECD. 2017:35. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm  
(accessed on 15 January 2018).  
 
The inflow of capital in such amounts would not have been possible without the 
relaxation in laws governing foreign capital and the removal of regulations regarding 
foreign shareholding and the liberalisation of rules governing foreign investments and 
repatriation of profit and money from India (Siddiqui, 2016a). The sharp increase in non-
debt inflows of foreign capital, especially in portfolio and foreign direct investment, 
indicates a new trend. As Chandrasekhar (2013:32) concluded: “India’s relationship with 
foreign capital has shifted from muted hostility to one of attracting and wining its 
confidence, the nature of the regime of accumulation has changed as well. These changes 
had indeed taken India on to a high growth trajectory by activating mechanisms that were 
very different in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. The long period of relatively high growth 
created the impression that… the high growth was now irreversible. The argument seeks 
to establish that… the regimes of accumulation themselves were fragile, besides the fact 
that growth driven by dependence of financial flows is vulnerable because of the 
possibility that such inflows can stop, and capital outflows could occur, including for 
reasons unrelated to circumstances in the host country.”  
However, greater reliance on foreign capital pressurised India to implement fiscal 
reforms by bringing legislation in the form of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budgetary 
Management Act (FRBM), which was passed in 2003 to bring down the fiscal deficit to 
GDP ratio to 3%. This was an attempt to restrain any attempt to raise growth based on 
debt-financed government spending (Patnaik, 2016). In the post-2003 period, foreign 
capital inflows surged, triggering a credit boom that was largely available only to rich and 
upper-middle class consumers for housing loans, automobiles, and to government for 
infrastructure. This created optimism and spurred growth, but also increased vulnerability 
and potential defaulting. In recent years, soon after the boom began, non-performing 
assets in the banking system have risen sharply and banks profitability could currently be 
under threat.  
It seems that the removal of restrictions on technology imports – so that foreign 
firms will find it more attractive to set up collaborative enterprises – would be likely to 
boost domestic production along with foreign capital, technology and management skills. 
Further capital liberalisation measures taken by the government provided opportunities 
for retail lending in Indian commercial banks’ portfolios. Suddenly, the influx of foreign 
capital provided excessive liquidity in the system, which could be lent to consumers to 
allow the purchase of housing, automobiles and consumer durables. This credit was also 
extended without any collateral and on the basis of speculative projections of borrowers’ 
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current earning profiles. Such individuals have often borrowed excessive amounts of 
money from multiple sources without revealing this to creditors. The availability of 
external funds resulted in an increase in debt-finance demand in the late 1990s. As 
Chandrasekhar (2013:20) argues: “[T]here was evidence of an incipient change in the 
regime of accumulation. There were two aspects to this change. The first was that private 
consumption expenditure on manufactured consumption goods and private investment in 
housing began to play a more important role (relative to public expenditure) in driving 
demand and growth. Second, associated with this, were signs that debt-financed private 
consumption expenditure was displacing debt-financed expenditure as a leading stimulus 
to growth.” 
 
Figure 3. Annual average growth increase 2015-16 
Source: OECD, 2017. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm (accessed on 
20 January 2018). 
 
In 2015-16, India’s growth performance was highest in the world, slightly above 
China, as shown in Figure 3. However, only looking at overall growth does not give us 
the full picture; rather, we need to analyse sectoral growth later on in this article. 
On the question of capital stock, during the pre-reform period the public sector was 
given the leading tasks of most capital-intensive projects such as irrigation canals, dams, 
electricity, steel mills, and so on. This accounted for a growing share of the country’s 
capital stock. The public sector constituted 41% of the Indian economy’s total capital 
stock in the 1980. However, the public sector’s share in India’s domestic output has 
stagnated since the late 1980s. Indeed, its share in capital stock has declined since 1990 
and employment has contracted by 10% since mid-1990s (Nagaraj, 2017). As Nagaraj 
(2015:42) argues, “The public sector’s share in GDP...plummeted to 20% by 2008-09, an 
unprecedented decline of 5 percentage points in five years. However, as the boom went 
bust after the global financial crisis, the private corporate sector floundered, contracting 
investment demand, and affecting the banking sector with burgeoning bad debts... Thus, 
after more than two decades of economic reforms, in 2012-13, the public sector’s share 
in GDP stood at 23% (2 percentage points less than in 1991), employing 17 million 
workers (two million less than in 1991)”.  
There is no doubt that since early 1990s industrial production has diversified with 
improvements in the quality of its products. However, the manufacturing sector’s share 
has stagnated at about 15%, while the industrial share has stagnated at around 26% of 
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GDP after the reforms (Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008). When we look at the experiences in 
other countries, such as East Asia and China, Indian industries have clearly not done very 
well. For instance, when we compare with China, both countries had roughly same levels 
of industrialisation in the 1950s; India, rather, at this time had slightly more developed 
industries than China, but by 2015 China became the world’s second-largest 
manufacturing country (Siddiqui, 2009), while India ranked tenth, producing one-quarter 
of China’s industrial output (Nagaraj, 2017). As Figure 4 indicates, in 2010, among the 
top manufacturing nations India was above Brazil, while China was second at the top just 
behind US; over just ten years, i.e., from 2000 to 2010, manufacturing declined in the US, 
but rose sharply in China, while India’s manufacturing also increased but to much less of 
a degree than China (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. World top 10 manufacturing nations in 2000 and 2010. 
Source: UNIDO’s International Year of Industrial Statistics, 2014. 
 
On the subjects of post-liberal reforms and industrial performance, Nagaraj 
(2017:63) summarises that: “the 25-years period can be subdivided into three distinct 
phases: 1992-96, 1997-2003 and 2003-14. The first phase represents the initial euphoria 
of reforms, with booming output and investment in the anticipation of a virtuous cycle of 
faster growth and exports. However, with the expectations of a boost in demand not being 
realised, industrial growth decelerated. It coincided with the Asian financial crisis, burst 
of the dot.com bubble, and freezing credit markets in the US in the early 2000s. The 
period from 2003 to 2014 represents. …the recant debt-led cycle boom and bust… The 
turnaround in industrial domestic output growth rates [in 2014] not supported by the 
trends in (i) credit growth and (ii) capacity utilisation in industry”. Nagaraj further 
(2017:67) notes: “the market-friendly policy framework constructed over the last quarter 
century has not served the manufacturing sector well, despite faster economic growth, 
and output diversification. The goal of rapid industrialising to catch up with the Asian 
peers, in an open trade and capital regime employing abundant labour for labour-intensive 
exports, did not materialise”. 
At present, the manufacturing sector contributes nearly 16% to India’s GDP, 
provides jobs for 10% of the country’s total workforce and produces nearly 80% of its 
total merchandise exports. Although the manufacturing sector is relatively small in 
comparison to India’s whole economy, this sector could nevertheless play an important 
role in raising India’s productivity and in its development efforts (Siddiqui, 2014b; 
2016b).  
In the light of a recent study by Dani Rodrik (2016), there is a need to revisit the 
question of industrialisation, which is still very important for creating employment, 
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diversifying the economy and removing the low productivity workforce from agriculture. 
However, according this study, the increased global integration and liberalisation has led 
to de-industrialisation in some regions. It is very important for a country like India to 
draw lessons from such a potentially adverse impact, which could be a huge destabilising 
factor in India. As Rodrik (2016:2) argues: “With some exceptions, confined largely to 
[East] Asia, developing countries have experienced falling manufacturing shares in both 
employment and real value added, especially since 1980s. For the most part, these 
countries had built up modest manufacturing during the 1950s and 60s, behind protective 
walls and under policies of import substitution. These industries have been shrinking 
significantly since then. The low-income economies of sub-Saharan Africa have been 
affected nearly as much by these trends as the middle-income economies of Latin 
America – though there was less manufacturing to begin with in the former group of 
countries…Developing countries are turning into service economies without having gone 
through a proper experience of industrialisation. I call this premature deindustrialisation.” 
Rodrik further narrates (2016:2-3) “There are two senses in which the shrinking of 
manufacturing in low and medium economies can be viewed as premature. The first, 
purely descriptive, sense is that these economies are undergoing deindustrialisation much 
earlier than the historical norms… The second sense in which this is premature is that 
early deindustrialisation may be detrimental effects on economic growth. Manufacturing 
activities have some features that make them instrumental in the process of growth”.  
Table 2. India’s macroeconomic indicators and projections (annual % changes), from 2013-14 to 
2018-19. 
 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18* 2018-19* 
Real GDP* 6.6 7.2 7.6 7.0 7.3 7.7 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 9.4 5.8 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.6 
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 6.0 2.0 -2.5 2.8 4.0 4.2 
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP) -6.7 -6.5 -7.2 -7.0 -6.7 -6.4 
Current Account Balance (% of 
GDP) 
-1.7 -1.3 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -0.9 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 3.4 4.9 3.9 0.4 4.3 7.3 
Total Domestic Expenditure 2.0 6.9 8.0 5.4 7.5 7.9 
Exports of Goods and Services, 
National Accounts Basis 
7.8 1.7 -5.2 4.5 4.6 5.2 
Imports of Goods and Services, 
National Accounts Basis 
-8.2 0.8 -2.8 -2.3 5.4 6.3 
Net Exports, Contribution to 
Growth of Real GDP 
4.5 0.2 -0.5 1.5 -0.2 -0.2 
Source: OECD, 2017:12. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm. 
(accessed on 6 January 2018).  
Note: *GDP measured in market prices (i.e., at factor costs plus indirect taxes, minus subsidies). 
 
Table 2 shows India’s macroeconomic changes (average annual % changes) from 
2013-14 to 2018-19. The figures of 2017-18 and 2018-19 are projected data from the 
OECD. India’s rates are projected to remain above 7% per annum, while the consumer 
price index is expected to remain low. Also, imports will remain higher than exports (see 
Table 2). 
The share of agriculture in terms of GDP in 1950-51 was 56.7%, while its share in 
total employment was 85% for the same period. The share of agriculture in GDP fell 
sharply thereafter, and by 2014-15 it was 13%, while the fall in the share in the 
agricultural employment was much slower (55%), and more than half the population still 
depends on agriculture for their livelihood, as shown in Table 3.   
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Table 3. Share of agriculture in GDP and employment in India. 
Year 
Share of agriculture in GDP at 
1999-2000 prices (%) 
Share of agriculture in 
employment (%) 
1950-51 56.70 85.0 
1960-61 52.48 77.3 
1970-71 46.00 63.9 
1980-81 40.00 60.0 
1991-92 34.04 58.1 
2001-02 25.18 57.3 
2011-12 14.00 56.0 
2015-16 13.05 55.0 
Source: National Sample Survey various years, Central Statistical Organisation, Government of 
India, New Delhi. 
 
 
Figure 5. Productivity in agriculture sector, cereal yield, 2014 
Source: OECD. 2017:48. http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-india.htm  
(accessed on 4 January 2018). 
 
Although India’s annual growth rate was the highest in the world in 2016, when we 
look at the productivity in agriculture, this is quite low for India and nearly half that of 
China, as indicated in the Figure 5. India’s productivity in the agricultural sector is less 
than in other developing countries such as Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil.   
During the neoliberal reforms, the agriculture sector had been completely ignored, 
despite nearly two-thirds of the population relying on it for employment and income. 
Also, the majority of India’s poor live in rural areas, and rely heavily on the performance 
of the agricultural sector. The 1991, the economic reforms package did not consider 
specific policy regarding agriculture, especially in terms of helping small and medium 
farmers. Moreover, it was presumed that freeing the agricultural markets and liberalising 
external trade in agricultural commodities would provide price incentives, leading to a 
rapid increase in the incomes of farmers and investment in agriculture. With the greater 
role of market forces leading to a sharp decline in the availability of institutional credit, 
subsides on fertilizer and electricity were also reduced drastically. All these developments 
increased difficulties for small and marginal farmers, who were forced into greater 
reliance on informal credit from money lenders and input from suppliers cum merchants.   
There has been little increase in income and productivity for the people trapped in 
the agricultural and informal sectors, which continue to employ around 90% of India’s 
entire workforce. Agricultural stagnation, poverty, sectarian and religious conflicts have 
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caused social instability and political division, which may well plague India in the future 
(Siddiqui, 2017a). In order to achieve sustainable growth in the future, India has to 
radically change the direction of its economic strategy towards a domestic wage-led 
growth and employment creation, and also employment diversification to shift workers 
away from the low-productivity agricultural sector to activities with higher productivity 
and value added in manufacturing.  
Since the introduction of the reforms, the government’s priority has changed from 
self-sufficiency in food production and consumption to production for export. The 
contribution of the agricultural and allied sectors to GDP has been steadily declining, and 
was only around 14% in 2016; the annual growth in the agricultural sector has been 
considerably lower than in other sectors.  
Under the WTO (World Trade Organisation), further adoption of trade 
liberalisation led to the removal of restrictions on exports for certain agricultural goods, 
particularly rice and wheat; import tariffs were also removed from a number of 
agricultural commodities. India becoming party to the WTO raised hopes that farmers 
would benefit from access to global markets. India agreed to zero tariffs on a wide range 
of crops; however, global uncertainties in prices and the nature of competition were 
ignored. Indian farmers operated in highly uncertain and volatile global markets, 
competing against highly subsidised and capital-intensive agribusiness in developed 
countries. When the global prices fell between 1996 and 2002, the adverse impact of 
imports were realised and India was forced to renegotiate with the WTO (Siddiqui, 
2016a). 
However, neoliberal reforms overlooked agriculture sector, which was a deliberate 
policy as government was keen to resolve the balance of payments crisis but seemed to 
have no long-term strategy. This decision was difficult to understand as about two-thirds 
of the workforce was directly or indirectly employed in agriculture sector in the Indian 
economy, and also more than three-quarters of the poor in rural areas. The economic 
reforms did not take into consideration this very important sector.  
In early 2000s, the rise of demand for IT services abroad has created an IT services 
boom as profits in this sector rose, providing opportunities for further foreign capital 
investment collaborations in this sector. This period also coincided with India beginning 
to be seen as a favoured destination for foreign financial investors. This was also a period 
when Indian businesses went for excessive borrowing from foreign securities. Moreover, 
in the 2010s, capital inflows exceeded the balance of payments leading to an appreciation 
for the Indian currency. In fact, excessive foreign capital inflows have resulted in surplus 
foreign exchange reserves, though it is important to note that these reserves are not earned 
through exports but are rather borrowed from foreign capital investors.  
With its increased integration with the global market, the Indian information 
technology (IT) industry has grown phenomenally. With the increased demands for 
software following the personal computer (PC) revolution in the 1980s, Indian IT 
companies have responded to the growing demand for networking. The 
commercialisation of the internet in the 1990s and growing demands for IT engineers 
from India to repair and maintain computers prompted the rapid growth of the IT industry. 
After the economic reforms of 1991, as observed by Das and Sagara (2017: 57), “India’s 
position as the preferred business process outsourcing (BPO) and knowledge process 
outsourcing (KPO) destination in the world had been established. India entered the global 
IT market by capitalising on the demand for low-cost but high-quality programming 
skills… Besides a favourable domestic policy climate and highly attractive export 
promotion schemes, a host of external factors was crucial for the growth of the software 
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industry”. Analysing the impressive performance of Indian IT services in recent years, 
Das and Sagara (2017: 57) further note that: “in 2005 alone, the IT and BPO/business 
process management (BPM) business had generated a revenue worth US$ 148 billion 
(amounting to 8.1% of the GDP), and its exports had amounted to approximately US$ 98 
billion. The Indian IT companies have set up to over 600 delivery centres across 78 
countries, thus maintaining their leadership position in the global sourcing arena... the 
Indian IT sector is still viewed by the major MNCs from the industrialised nations as a 
destination where cheap labour is available”. 
The important question is whether the rapid economic growth was actually due to 
the economic liberalisation policy of the 1991, to which it is often attributed. To answer 
this, Nayyar (2017:45) states: “If we consider the 20th century in its entirety, the turning 
point in economic performance, or the structural break in economic growth, is 1951-52. 
If we consider the period 1950-1951 to 2000-01, the turning point in economic growth is 
1980-81… During the 20th century, the most significant structural break, or departure 
from the long-term trend in economic growth, was 1951-52, followed by 1980-81. In 
either case, 1991 was not a turning point… Therefore, it is not possible to attribute the 
significant jump in India’s growth performance to economic liberalisation even on a post 
hoc, ergo propter hoc basis.” He further (2017:46) notes: “The biggest failure of the last 
25 years is that, despite such rapid economic growth, employment creation has simply 
not been commensurate. In fact, the employment elasticity of output declined steadily 
from reasonably high levels during 1972-73 to 1983 (0.60) through modest levels during 
1983 to 1993-94 (0.41), to low levels during 1993-94 to 2004-05 (0.17) and 2004-05 to 
2011-12 (0.04). In fact, between 2004-05 and 2011-12, employment elasticity of output 
in agriculture (-0.42) and in manufacturing (0.13) plummeted, as compared to the 1983 
to 1993-94 period when in was much higher in both agriculture (0.49) and manufacturing 
(0.47).” 
 
CONCLUSION 
India and China were the top two manufacturing nations worldwide until the British 
conquest of Bengal and the defeat of the Chinese in the first opium war. In fact, 
colonialism degraded the Indian economy and squeezed the incentives for local 
investment in industry and agriculture. For the majority of the colonial period, Indian 
agriculture stagnated and foodgrain output fell. As a result, peasants became highly 
indebted to money lenders and had hardly any support from public expenditure on 
irrigation, soil management or rural infrastructure, particularly devastating when the 
agricultural sector experienced crop failure and drought. The primary goal for the British 
colonial administration was to extract revenues from the peasantry. From the mid-18th 
century, India’s economy was integrated into the British colonial system which, besides 
extracting surplus value, also imposed an international division of labour with unequal 
terms of trade where India was turned into a supplier of primary commodities.  
During the colonial period, the Indian economy became subservient rather than 
sovereign in terms of policy matters. The Indian economic surplus was transferred to 
Britain, which did not lead to job creation into the local economy. As a result, economic 
development was hampered by the removal of ‘surplus’, along with very high land rents 
and tribute charges. A densely populated country like India was drawn into the orbit of 
exploitation in the mid-18th century and, later on, into the interest of British industry. 
Such development created mass poverty, de-industrialisation, starvation and famine 
across the entirety of India.   
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The study found that soon after independence in 1947, the Indian government took 
a number of initiatives to enhance industrial and agricultural development. Initially, these 
met with some modest success including building key industries, becoming self-sufficient 
in terms of food production and improving literacy rates. However, the biggest failure 
was that it did not make any real impression on the country’s huge unemployment 
problems. By the mid-1960s economic growth had begun to falter and the fiscal crisis of 
the state deepened. Finally, India sought an IMF loan in 1991 to avert balance of payment 
crisis. In return, India was asked to adopt neoliberal reforms.  
To compare Indian economic policies under neoliberal reforms with those of the 
previous period under dirigisme would seem to be important, particularly when we 
consider this comparison in terms of employment expansion. In the period of neoliberal 
reform, the growth rates accelerated to 7% annually, but the rate of growth of employment 
has remained at only 1%, while in the dirigiste period the average growth rate was 3.5%, 
but the expansion of employment was doubled i.e., 2% annually. It seems that rate of 
employment growth was far below the natural growth rate of the workforce. This is 
greater when we further consider displaced peasants and petty producers due to the 
accelerated process of “primitive accumulation” unleashed by the economic reforms. The 
neoliberal reform, rather than creating new jobs, saw the total number of unemployed rise 
and the steady growth of the relative size of the labour reserve. 
In fact, in the late 1950s and 1960s the industrial sector did witness a sharp rise. For 
example, the share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 9% in 1951 to 16% in 1961. 
Indeed, a decade later this share reached 18% before reaching its peak of 20% in 1996. 
However, the industrial share in GDP was still less in comparison to other developing 
economies, particularly in East Asia. For example, in 1971, the manufacturing share in 
GDP for South Korea was 25%, Malaysia 28%, Thailand 26%, China 35% and Brazil 
29% (Siddiqui, 2017b). 
The Indian growth story is one of around 4% per annum from the 1950s through to 
1981, and then 6.3% from 1982 to 2016 (Nayyar, 2017). The source of recent high growth 
appears to be rooted in services such as real estate, construction, automobiles, IT 
industries, commercial centres, and the financial sector. Many of these new developments 
are taking place around urban and semi-urban centres. By contrast, India’s rural economy 
has experienced very slow growth and, indeed, near stagnation during the pro-market 
reform period (Dreze and Sen. 2013). The study has argued that India’s progress towards 
industrialisation has been disappointing and the optimism that foreign capital and 
technology would bring efficiency and boost growth in manufacturing has largely been 
proven unfounded. In fact, manufacturing is very important for a country like India, where 
rapidly growing manufacturing, besides earning foreign capital, can utilise labour, 
increase productivity and incomes through linkages and spill-overs into other sectors. 
However, since neoliberal reforms were undertaken in 1991, the agriculture sector 
hardly saw any benefits and, during this period, its growth rates were negligible (Siddiqui, 
2010). The pursuit of neoliberal economic policies has led to the withdrawal of the state 
role in assisting farmers in particular and the rural sector in general, and is instead 
promoting the interests of global financial capital, with which the Indian corporate capital 
is closely integrated. Despite the fact that the majority of the country’s population has not 
witnessed any improvement in its living conditions, the government nevertheless 
celebrates this as a “great achievement”; it has completely ignored economists such as 
John Stuart Mill when he said that he did not mind a zero growth rate if workers are better 
off in such a stationary state than in a growing economy. For him, improvements in 
workers’ real incomes should take priority over high GDP growth rates. On this account, 
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the statistics reveal that half of India’s population has witnessed stagnation in its real per 
capita income.   
It seems that recent growth based on neoliberal economic policies are fragile as 
their success relies heavily on foreign capital inflows (Siddiqui, 1998); if such inflows 
reverse due to external reasons or the global situation, then this could lead to a similar 
situation as that experienced during the 1997 East Asian crisis.  
India should focus its efforts on building its industrial sector based on 
manufacturing because it is well established that increasing returns are received based on 
productivity growth and also where backward and forward linkages to the rest of the 
economy could be established. India faces many challenges of poverty and growing 
inequality. It needs to stimulate growth within its manufacturing sector rather than 
increasing dependence on export-led growth, as such a strategy relies on foreign demands 
and markets which are already stagnant and for which there is little hope of a dramatic 
reversal.  
Now, after more than a quarter of a century since the inception of the neoliberal 
market reforms, it seems that the high growth rate has failed to make any impression in 
expansion of employment. Therefore, the study argues that the problems are not just in 
rapid growth rates, but the reliance on unsustainable stimuli to growth. The current growth 
is not sustainable as it is unable to address the problems of massive unemployment and 
other forms of social deprivation in India. 
The study suggests that an alternative economic policy is needed, which should be 
based on raising the incomes of agricultural workers, expanding domestic markets, and 
the revival of public investment in crucial areas such as irrigation, education and health. 
Such measures would eliminate illiteracy and improve health and will raise productivity 
and domestic markets. Therefore, government intervention is needed to achieve inclusive 
growth; such intervention should be aimed at increasing employment and redistributing 
incomes, and ultimately ensuring access to basic services such as food, education and 
health care. 
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